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SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA 
I L 
~JAN ~ ~ 2013 
11 CARLA ISON, PH.D., Case No. 1-10-CV-163032 
12 Plaintiff, 
13 vs. 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT (2) 
14 
15 
16 
17 
GOOGLE, INC., a California corporation; 
YAHOO! Inc., a California corporation, and 
DOES 1. through 98, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
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The two separate Motions for Summary Judgment/Adjudication by Defendant Yahoo! 
Inc. ("Yahoo") and Defendant Google, Inc. ("Google") directed at all remaining causes of action 
in Plaintiffs Fourth Amended Complaint ("4AC") carne on for hearing before the Honorable 
Kevin E. McKenney on January 8, 2013, at 9:00 a.m. in Department 20. The matter having been 
submitted, the Court finds and orders as follows: 
Plaintiffs request for a continuance to allow for discovery into both Defendants' alleged 
misuse ofPlaintifPs "Ison Marks" is DENIED. The declaration of Plaintiffs limited scope 
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counsel Saralynn Mandel does not satisfy the requirements for a mandatory continuance under 
CCP §437c(h) in that it fails to establish why the information sought is essential to opposing 
these motions (both of which primarily argue that the "Ison Marks" do not qualify for 
trademark/trade name protection) and fails to give any estimate of the time necessary to obtain 
such evidence. The request is therefore a discretionary request. Framed as such, the request is 
7. DENIED because it does not seek discovery relevant to the central thrust of both motions; that 
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the "Is on Marks" are descriptive telIDS which must be shown to have acquired secondary 
meaning before they are even entitled to protection as trademarks and/or trade names. See FSR 
Brokerage, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 35 Cal App 4th 69, 73-74 (no error in denying continuance to 
investigate moving party's knowledge of certain conditions where summary judgment motion 
was based on other grounds); Depew v. Crocodile Enterprises, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal App 4th 480, 
493 (no error in denying request for discovery of corroborative evidence that was not "essential" 
to justify opposition); Ace American Ins. Co. v. Walker (2004) 121 Cal App 4th 1017, 1023 (cou 
need not grant a continuance where the proposed discovery is "focused on matters beyond the 
scope of the dispositive issues framed by the pleadings.") 
Defendants' separate motions for summary judgment are both GRANTED as follows: 
Plaintiff is bound by her pleading on summary judgment. See Nieto v. Blue Shield of Calif. Life 
& Health Ins. (2010) 181 Cal App 4th 60, 73 ("the pleadings determine the scope of relevant 
issues on a summary judgment motion.") Despite Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary in her 
oppositions and at the hearing on these motions, Defendants have established that all causes of 
action remaining in Plaintiffs 4AC depend on the assertion that the "Ison Marks" are protected 
trademarks/trade names. See 4AC at 12: "This lawsuit relates to the use of trade names on the 
Internet, particularly the unauthorized use of the trade names [hereafter the 'CARLA ISON 
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Marks'] that identify CARLA ISON, doing business as Carla Ison, Ph.D., or 
www.carlaisonphd.com to Internet users. The fundamental purpose of trade name law in the 
bricks-and-mortar world and on the Internet is to protect consumers from being confused as to 
the source or affiliation ofthe products or services that they seek to buy." At 14-15 the 4AC 
continues to allege that: "Google and Yahoo are identified in this lawsuit because the problem of 
misuse of the Ison Marks has occurred on the websites and through the technology of each of 
these Defendants ... The reason for the misuse of the Plaintiffs trademark by Defendants 
Google and Yahoo is clear: the Defendants profit by directly infringing trademarks, by selling 
rights to the use of trademarks to third parties, and by forcing trade or service mark owners to bi 
on their own marks in order to have their company or professional information placed at or near 
the top of a search result list when someone does a search on their trademarks on the Defendants' 
websites." 
Not only does the 4AC incorporate these allegations into every cause of action by 
reference, but as Defendant Yahoo points out (in its brief at 7 :22-26) each of Plaintiff s 
remaining causes of action also contains language making it clear that all of them arise from and 
depend upon Plaintiffs allegations that the "Ison Marks" are protected trademarks/trade names. 
See 4AC at 84-100 (1 st cause of action, "Common Law Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement"), 104-110 (2nd cause of action, "Contributory Trade Name/Service Mark 
Infringement"), 123-129 (4th cause of action, "Dilution [of trademark] under the Common 
Law"), 132-134 (5th cause of action, "Misappropriation") and 146-147 (7th cause of action, 
"Unfair Competition," alleging in part that Defendants "have been unjustly enriched through 
their unlawful and unauthorized sales and other uses of the Carla Ison Marks ... ") 
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"A trademark may be protected under the common law or the Lanham Act if it is either 
inherently distinctive or it has acquired distinctiveness. Inherently distinctive trademarks-such 
as fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive words and symbols-are protected 'because their intrinsic 
nature serves to identify a particular source of a product [or service].' But trademarks that are 
not inherently distinctive-such as descriptive words or symbols--are protected only if they have 
acquired secondary meaning, i.e., they 'h[ave] become distinctive ofthe [owners'] goods [or 
services] in commerce." Generally, 'personal names are regarded as in the same category as 
descriptive terms' and ( are placed by the common law into that category of noninherently 
distinctive terms which require proof of secondary meaning for protection.' '" A trademarks' 
primary meaning does not have to disappear for the mark to acquire secondary meaning. But the 
mark's primary (i.e., descriptive) meaning must be subordinate to its secondary meaning as an 
indicator of the source of goods or services, The United States Supreme Court has explained tha 
secondary meaning 'occurs when, 'in the minds ofthe public, the primary significance of a 
[mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself. ", Franklin Mint Co. 
v. Manatt, Phelps & Phillips LLP, et al. (2010) 184 Cal App 4th 313, 336-338, emphasis added, 
internal citations omitted but quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc. (2000) 529 
U.S. 205, 211. 
Both of Plaintiff's "Ison Marks" are descriptive terms and under both California and 
federal law Plaintiff has the burden of proving that they have acquired secondary meaning before 
they are protected as trademarks and/or trade names. The allegations of the 4AC itself, 
Plaintiff's discovery responses and deposition testimony (attached as exhibits to the declarations 
of Yahoo counsel Christopher Varas and Google counsel Michael Powell) and the market survey 
and declaration by Hal Poret (presented by Yahoo but also relied on by Google) are sufficient to 
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establish: 1) that all of Plaintiff s remaining claims are based on and depend upon the allegation 
that her "Ison Marks" are protected trademarks/trade names; 2) that Plaintiff has no evidence that 
either of her "Ison Marks," which are both plainly descriptive terms, have acquired any 
secondary meaning, and; 3) admissible evidence-the survey by Mr. Poret of the most relevant 
market area-establishes that the "Ison Marks" have not acquired secondary meaning in the 
minds of the public in that most relevant market area. See North Carolina Dairy Foundation, 
Inc. v. Foremost-McKesson, Inc. (1979) 92 Cal App 2d 98, 109-110 ("Proof of secondary 
meaning is sufficient of it shown that a substantial segment of the buying population associates 
the mark with a single source. ... Such buyers' association [or lack thereof] may be shown by a 
scientifically conducted opinion survey in the relevant market area. .., The admissibility and 
weight of such evidence [are] matters committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.") 
Bracketed comments added. This evidence meets both Defendants' initial burdens. 
When the burden shifts to Plaintiff, she is unable to raise any triable issues of material 
fact through admissible evidence. "There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the 
evidence would allow a reasonable finder of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party 
opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof." Aguilar v. Atlantic 
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 CaL4tb 826, 850. Plaintiff is bound by the allegations in her Complaint, 
her statements in discovery and in deposition testimony all to the effect that she believes her 
"Ison Marks" are protected trademarks/trade names and have been so protected since she began 
using them regardless of her lack of market penetration. Plaintiff has no evidence that her marks 
have acquired secondary meaning and the unsworn statement by Robert Duboff submitted by 
Plaintiff does not qualify as an affidavit. See CCP §2003 ('''Affidavit' Defined"), "An affidavit 
is a written declaration under oath, made without notice to the adverse party." Emphasis added. 
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Even if the contents of the Duboff statement were considered, because the statement does 
nothing more than criticize the Poret report Plaintiff still is without any evidence to satisfy her 
burden of establishing that her allegedly protected marks have acquired secondary meaning. 
Given the evidence submitted, no reasonable finder of fact could find for Plaintiff on the key 
question of whether her "Ison Marks" have acquired secondary meaning in the minds of the 
public sufficient to qualify as protected trademarks and/or trade names. 
Dated: 
Kevin E. McKenney 
Judge of the Superior Court 
6 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
-----------------------------------~-----------------
SDPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA IL 
Plaintiff: 
CARLA IS ON, PH.D. 
Defendant: 
GOOGLE, INC, etc., et al 
PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL OF:ORDER RE: MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (2); ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR LEAVE TO FILE FIFTH AMENDED COMPLAINT; 
and, ORDER DENYING CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: I certify that I am not a party to this case and that a true copy of 
this document was mailed first class, postage fully prepaid, in a sealed envelope addressed as shown below and 
the document was mailed at SAN JOSE, CALIFORNIA on January 23,2013: 
Carla Ison, Ph.D. 
P.O. Box 60401 
Palo Alto, CA 94306 
Margret M. Caruso 
Quinn, Emanuel, Urquhart, et a1. 
555 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 560 
Redwood Shores, CA 94065-2139 
David HOgwEfExecutive Officer/Clerk 
BY ,Deputy 
Wand Waldera 
Barry VanSickle 
970 Sunrise Boulevard, Suite 125-315 
Roseville, CA 95661 
Dennis Wilson 
Keats, McFarland & Wilson, LLP 
9720 Wilshire Boulevard 
Penthouse Suite 
Beverly Hills, CA 90212 
Proof of service 
Clerk's Certificate of Service 
